The Washington Wave

What the files hold

No unit of Project Blue Book in the National Archives catalogue is titled for Washington in July 1952. Most of the papers are in a unit of 320 images that the catalogue titles “SAN FRANCISCO CALIF, [ILLEGIBLE] 1952” (NAID 28945857). The catalogue has no transcription of it, so every quotation from it on this page is our reading of the images. It holds, among other papers:

• five Weather Bureau adiabatic charts (images 40–44), whose dates we could not read; frames 1119–1158 of the roll are missing between images 44 and 45;
• a message from Headquarters USAF of 20 July on the report of Harry G. Barnes, senior controller at Washington National Airport (image 47), and a message from Andrews AFB (image 48);
• the analysis of 29 August 1952 by Maj. John E. Libbert, chief of the Electronics Branch (images 51 and 61–62);
• statements taken at Andrews AFB on 20 July (images 66–74) and Andrews’ intelligence report on that night (image 118);
• the memorandum of the Civil Aeronautics Administration’s Washington Center with the report of its senior controller on 19/20 July (images 83–85);
• report 52-1 of Headquarters Command (images 150 and 152; another typing of part II is image 98);
• a report of the Tenth Air Force on Capt. Casey Pierman of Capital Airlines (images 137–138);
• the report on the night of 26/27 July partially witnessed by Maj. Fournet and Lt. Holcomb (images 127–130);
• Andrews’ intelligence report on 26 July (image 198), and the centre’s log of the night (images 261–263);
• an undated summary that names the Foreign Technology Division (image 120), a routing slip of 1960 (image 63) and two replies to members of the public, one of 1 September 1961 and one to a letter of November 1961 (images 87, 77–78).

The next unit, which the catalogue titles “[BLANK], [BLANK]” (NAID 28946178), holds Barnes’s own account in a newspaper clipping (images 21–22). Blue Book’s index of sightings is NAID 28921348 (images 63, 66–67), and the minutes of the press conference of 29 July are in Blue Book’s administrative files, catalogued as “Press Conference - Gen. Sanford [sic] 1952” (NAID 461459117). Outside the Air Force there are two FBI memoranda of 29 July 1952, a Department of State memorandum of 28 July and a CIA folder on the scientific panel of January 1953.

19/20 July

The CAA’s senior controller wrote the next day (image 84):

“At 2340E (19th) Controller Nugent called my attention to several targets observed on the VC-2 scope. Eight of them were counted and, although an occasional strong return was noted, most of the targets would be classified as fair to weak. After we had checked carefully on the movement (about 100 to 130mph) and confirmed our findings with what the Tower saw on the ASR, I called MFS and reported it. This was about midnight EST.”

The centre’s maintenance staff checked the equipment “and advised that it was functioning satisfactorily” (image 84). Then came the pilots:

“As time wore on, pilot reports were received - P807 saw 7 of the objects between Washington and Martinsburg variously described as lights that moved very rapidly, up and down and horizontally as well as hovering in one position and SP610 saw one come in with him from around Herndon and follow him to within 4 miles of touch-down. This was substantiated by Tower and Center radar.” (image 84)

Headquarters USAF passed on Barnes’s report the same day: “WASHINGTON CENTER RADAR SUBSTANTIATED ELECTRONICALLY THAT OBJECT WAS FOLLOWING AS PILOT OBSERVED.” (image 47) The senior controller’s report says how the night ended: “At about 0530E Controller Ritchey reported seeing 10 targets in the vicinity of ADW which was confirmed by the other man in radar and I went in and counted 7 or 8 in scattered positions which indicated a very rapid movement if they were the same ones seen near ADW.” (image 85) It also says: “It would be extremely difficult to write this so that it is in a logical sequence due to the confusion that seems to have existed throughout the whole affair.” (image 85)

At Andrews AFB the approach control officer, Capt. Harold C. May, wrote that when Washington Center first called, “Nothing appeared on our radar scopes”; of a light watched at about 0200 he concluded, “I believe the unidentified object was a star.” At about 0415 EST, asked about a target three miles north of Riverdale, “there was definitely a motionless target at the place Washington Center had indicated”; it stayed for 25 to 30 seconds and disappeared (image 68). Andrews’ intelligence report: “The visual sightings are not consistent in that several reports state that objects were believed to be stars. The only positive report is the targets on the radar scope.” (image 118) A letter of 1 September 1961 in the file puts it more flatly: “According to the controller and later confirmed by Air Force sources, Andrews AFB radar operators were unable to pick up these images on their radars.” (image 87)

Capt. Casey Pierman of Capital Airlines took off in the early morning and was asked by the centre to look for the objects. He saw several fast bluish-white lights. When the centre told him the objects were at ten o’clock, “pilot stated he plainly observed a DC-4 type aircraft at ten (10) o’clock level proceeding in the opposite direction” (Tenth Air Force, image 137).

Interceptors. The file disagrees with itself. A message from Andrews: “NO ACFT WERE SCRAMBLED, HOWEVER [redacted] WAS NOTIFIED BY WASH ARTC” (image 48). Report 52-1: “Washington Tower also heard conversation between ‘Gas Bag 17’ and Andrews (jet intercept). He reported over Andrews Air Base at 0300 EST at 21,000 feet, said he was low on fuel and was returning to his base.” (image 152) The CAA’s report says that “more information was needed to order an intercept” (image 84).

26/27 July

The report written by Maj. Fournet and Lt. Holcomb, who went to the centre that night (images 127–130), begins: “Varying numbers (up to 12 simultaneously) of u/i targets on ARTC radar scope. Termed by CAA personnel as ‘generally, solid returns’, similar to a/c return except slower.” The tower’s radar crew “reports only one target positively u/i” (image 127). The radars were the “VG-2 radar (ARTC) and ASR-1 radar (Tower)” (image 128).

Interceptors went up this time: “2 F-94’s were scrambled from Newcastle at 2300 EDT. ARTC controlled F-94’s after arrival in area and vectored them to targets with generally negative results” (image 128). A second flight followed. “Two flights of interceptors were dispatched from Newcastle, Del., but their official reports have not been received by this office” (image 127). The centre’s log, kept to the minute, records the night from the controllers’ side: “2146 NC 12 spotted 5 objects that were giving off a glow of light from orange to white - altitude 2200 feet.” (image 261) The log is marked as Eastern Standard Time, an hour behind the report’s EDT; the same sighting from NC-12 is at 2246 EDT in the report (image 128; our reading of the matching entries).

Holcomb looked at the scopes himself and reported “7 good, solid targets”. He checked with the airport weather station and found “a slight temperature inversion (about 1°) from the surface to about 1000’. However, he felt that the scope targets at that time were not the result of this inversion and so advised the Command Post with the suggestion that a second intercept flight be requested.” (image 128) Later in the night “many dim and unstable targets (assumed due to temperature inversion) were observed” (image 128). The report adds that the centre’s crew said targets had appeared before, “but never before had they appeared in such quantities over such a prolonged period and with such definition as was experienced on the nights of 19/20 and 26/27 July 52” (image 130).

Andrews’ intelligence report on 26 July: “Targets seen on the radar scope are the only positive reports.” Its evaluation, written by hand: “Unk” (image 198).

The figure of about 7,000 mph

The figure goes back to one trace on one night. Report 52-1 of Headquarters Command, whose source is given as “Control Tower Operators” (image 150), says of 19/20 July: “The targets remained on the radar scope until 0030 EST during this time one (1) target left a trace from West of Andrews to Riverdale a distance of seven (7) miles in four (4) seconds.” (image 152)

• Seven miles in four seconds is 6,300 miles per hour; that is our calculation, not the report’s.
• On image 152 someone has written “(7300 mph)” beside the line. The other typing of the same page, image 98, has no such note.
• The undated summary has the objects “reported to have speeds on the order of 7500 miles per hour” (image 120), and an Air Force reply to a letter of November 1961 repeats it (images 77–79).
• The report describes a single trace, not a series of returns measured one after another. Of other targets that night the CAA’s senior controller wrote that they “indicated a very rapid movement if they were the same ones” (image 85).
• The targets he and Nugent checked moved at “about 100 to 130mph” (image 84).
• The Blue Book files hold no weather data for that night.

The press conference of 29 July

The minutes are headed “MINUTES OF PRESS CONFERENCE HELD BY MAJOR GENERAL JOHN A. SAMFORD DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, U. S. AIR FORCE” and “29 JULY 1952 - 4:00 p. m. - Room 3E-869, The Pentagon”; with Samford were Maj. Gen. Roger M. Ramey, Director of Operations, and four officers and officials of the Air Technical Intelligence Center (image 2).

Asked whether interceptors had seen anything on their radarscopes, Ramey said there had been no airborne radar sightings (image 7), and: “In one instance, they reported locking on to an object. It is pretty clear from the discussion of the pattern of two airplanes that went out that one of them was locked on to the other one.” (image 8) Asked whether Andrews and National “actually got a triangulation on anything”, Capt. James answered: “You see, the records made and kept aren’t accurate enough to tie that in that close.” (image 12) On the inversion, Samford said: “So the gamble as to whether that is the cause or not is about a fifty-fifty proposition.” James agreed that the effect of an inversion on radar waves “is fairly well established”, and added: “We don’t have sufficient information to say definitely that that was the cause.” (image 16)

Outside the Air Force

The FBI. On 29 July 1952 the Washington Field Office reported to the Director that at a conference the day before an officer of the Office of Special Investigations at Bolling had said his office received reports of aerial objects “over the prior weekend”, and that “the Air Force is greatly concerned about this matter of aerial objects” (FBI file 62-HQ-83894, Section 6, p. 190). A memorandum of the same day for A. H. Belmont gives its purpose as “To advise at the present time the Air Force has failed to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion in its research regarding numerous reports of flying saucers and flying discs sighted throughout the United States.” (p. 196) It records a briefing from Air Intelligence: the saucers “are most frequently observed in areas where there is heavy air traffic, such as Washington, D.C., and New York City”; reports by pilots “for which there is additional corroboration, such as recording by radar or sighting from the ground” were “two or three per cent” of the total and had “never been satisfactorily explained” (p. 198); “when the pilot in the jet approaches the object it invariably fades from view.” (p. 199)

The Department of State. A memorandum of 28 July 1952, signed “F.H.”, reports General Samford’s answer to an inquiry: the flying saucer business “is still a complete enigma”, and “credible observers are reporting the incredible.” It goes on: “The radar observation may have elements of ‘electronic fluke,’ but is sufficiently tied in with pilot observation so that it cannot be attributed entirely to this.” The memorandum names neither Washington nor any date of a sighting; only its own date ties it to the wave (our reading).

The CIA. A panel of scientists met on 14–17 January 1953 (CIA-UAP-002, PDF p. 10), convened, in the words of a letter of 13 March 1953 from the secretary of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, “at the direction of General Smith, following the recommendation of the Intelligence Advisory Committee” (PDF p. 5). Its report lists “Washington, D. C. area (19 July 1952)” among the “case histories of significant sightings discussed in detail” (PDF p. 17), and says: “It was the Panel’s opinion that some of the Air Force concern over U.F.O.’s (notwithstanding Air Defense Command anxiety over fast radar tracks) was probably caused by public pressure.” (PDF p. 19) What the panel recommended is taken up in the claim “The CIA ordered the truth about UFOs to be concealed”.

What the files say about the label

Blue Book’s index carries the nights under several labels:

• “HOAX”. Among additional sightings that were not made cases: “1551 20 Washington, D. C. & Vicinity Message Other (HOAX)” (NAID 28921348, image 63). We did not find message 1551 itself.
• “UNIDENTIFIED”. The sightings of 25–26 July list “Washington, D. C. (FOLDER)” as “Multiple UNIDENTIFIED” and “Andrews AFB, Washington, D.C. (FOLDER)” as “UNIDENTIFIED” (image 66).
• “UNKNOWN” and “ASTRO”. The list “WASHINGTON D.C. AND SURROUNDING AREA NOV/DEC 49/JULY 52” gives folder 1649, “19 Washington D.C.”, no evaluation; folder 1651, “20-26 Washington D.C. Pilots”, “ASTRO”; and folder 1661, “26 Washington D.C. Civ/Mil”, “UNKNOWN”. It also lists “Weather Bureau Charts - K243.6012-1 (July 1952)” (image 67).

Andrews AFB’s report on 26 July is evaluated “Unk” (NAID 28945857, image 198).

The undated summary that names the Foreign Technology Division (image 120):

“Unfortunately the only day for which weather data was obtained was for 26 July 1952. The data on this day showed that there was a temperature inversion at 800 feet and at 4000 feet.”

“The FTD conclusion is that the radar and visual sightings on 26 July 1952 were due to the mirage effects created by a double inversion. It is also concluded that since the circumstances of 19/20 and 27 July 1952 parallel to those of 26 July 1952, that similar conditions existed and that the sightings were due to the same cause.”

What the files say about these labels depends on the night.

26/27 July. The conclusion rests on the soundings of that night. Libbert, who read them in August 1952 as “slight temperature inversions at 800 feet and at 4,000 feet altitude” (image 61), offered propagation only as “a plausible explanation as to the possible cause”, and began: “A study of the various reports regarding the subject radar sightings do not allow a positive and final explanation to be made. This is a characteristic of practically all radar reports of unidentified and/or unconventional targets. As usual, the factual and scientific data necessary for analysis is not available.” (image 51) Holcomb, at the scopes that night, judged that the targets “were not the result of this inversion” (image 128).

19/20 July. The Blue Book files have no weather data for this night: “Weather data is available during the time of subject radar sighting for the 26th only.” (image 61) The summary’s label for it is carried over by analogy, because the circumstances “parallel” those of 26 July (image 120).

In 1960 a routing slip summed it up as “Anomalous radar returns caused by temperature inversions” (image 63).

The Condon report, 1968

Gordon Thayer reviewed both nights in the report’s chapter on radar and optical analyses, using soundings from Silver Hill, Maryland. Of the profile for 19 July at 2200 he wrote that “A number of significant levels are missing from this profile”, and noted that the radar sightings were made later, “between 2340 LST and 0540 LST (July 20)”. He found the radar tracks “generally not correlated with each other, with airborne radar/visual observations, or with ground visual reports, except in a very general way, e.g., a star sighted on the azimuth supplied by the radar track.” His three conclusions:

“The atmospheric conditions during the period 19-20 and 25-27 July, 1952, in the Washington, D. C., area, were conducive to anomalous propagation of radar signals;”

“The unidentified radar returns obtained during these incidents were most likely the result of anomalous propagation (AP);”

“The visual objects were, with one or two possible exceptions, identifiable as most probably meteors and scintillating stars.”

Where it was

The pin is OpenStreetMap’s point for Washington National Airport (relation 9313825, 38.8513° N, 77.0397° W), rounded to 38.85° N, 77.04° W. Both radars that tracked the targets stood there: “Radar located at Washington National Airport, Washington, D. C. (Alexandria, Va.)” (image 128). The targets were reported over Andrews AFB, Riverdale and the city, and pilots saw lights between Washington and Martinsburg and near Herndon (images 47, 84). The pin marks the radars, not a position of any target.

Why this scores where it does

Witnesses: 4. CAA controllers, the tower’s radar operators, staff at Andrews AFB, airline pilots and, on 26/27 July, two intelligence officers at the scopes, each named or placed by unit in the file. Not 5: Andrews’ report calls the visual sightings “not consistent” (image 118), the pilots speak in the file only through others’ reports, and the interceptor crews’ own reports were never received (image 127).

Radar: 3. Two radars at National tracked targets for hours on both nights, with operators who checked their equipment, and the centre’s log of 26/27 July gives times to the minute. Not higher: no scope photograph is in the file, Andrews’ radar saw nothing in the first hour of 19/20 July, and the analysts of 1952 called propagation a plausible cause.

Optics: 0. No photograph or film of the targets is in the file; a Tenth Air Force officer could only say “there is a possibility that scope photographs were made providing the equipment was available” (image 138).

Physical trace: 0. None.

Multi-channel: 4. Two radars, lights reported by pilots and ground observers, and interceptors sent up. Not 5: on 19/20 July only the two radars at National agreed, and the radar and the lights are tied together at the level of time and place, not return by return.

Documentation: 5. The CAA’s report, the centre’s log, two reports from Andrews, report 52-1, the report of 26/27 July, Libbert’s analysis, the index, the minutes of the press conference and the FBI, State Department and CIA papers can all be opened.

Anomaly: 3. Targets that the operators judged solid and that Holcomb did not put down to the inversion, and lights that kept pace with aircraft. The one high speed in the file rests on a single trace, and most targets moved at 100 to 130 miles per hour.

Data today: 2. No scope photographs, no weather data for 19/20 July in the Blue Book files, no interceptor crews’ reports, and forty frames missing from the roll.

The overall is 2.6: class C, material gaps.

What would settle it

• The F-94 crews’ own reports of 26/27 July, which “have not been received by this office” (image 127).
• Scope photographs, if any were made (image 138).
• Weather data for the night of 19/20 July: there are none in the Blue Book files, and Thayer’s Silver Hill profile is for 2200, before the targets appeared, with levels missing.
• A Project 10073 record card for either night; we found none in these units.
• Frames 1119–1158 of roll 12, missing between images 44 and 45.
• The dates of the five Weather Bureau charts (images 40–44).