Tehran

What the file holds

The account of that night comes from one message. The US Defense Attaché Office in Tehran sent it to the Defense Intelligence Agency on 23 September 1976 (“P 230630Z SEP 76”, “THIS IS IR 6 846 0139 76”), under the name of “FRANK B. MCKENZIE, COL, USAF, DATT”. Its last paragraph says how the office learned what it reports:

“ACTUAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT WAS OBTAINED FROM SOURCE IN CONVERSATION WITH A SUB-SOURCE, AND IIAF PILOT OF ONE OF THE F-4S. MORE INFORMATION WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.” (DIA file 238156, page 4)

In October 1978 the US Air Force Security Service reprinted an account of the incident with a note of its own: “Although this incident is incomplete and cannot be substantiated, it contains food for thought.” (“MIJI Quarterly”, October 1978, NAID 40989205, image 3)

The message can be opened in three places:

• the copy received at the Joint Chiefs of Staff message center, with DIA’s stamp of 23 September 1976 and the distribution list, in DIA’s FOIA reading room (file 238156);
• the same scans, behind a DIA routing slip of 8 December 1978 and DIA’s evaluation of the report, among the records from the National Security Agency in the National Archives (NAID 596347947);
• the message as the Joint Chiefs of Staff relayed it to “SECSTATE WASH DC”, “C I A”, “NSA WASH DC”, “WHITE HOUSE WASH DC” and the chiefs of the services, in the same records (NAID 596347929).

Also public: the attaché office’s report of July 1978 that answers DIA’s evaluation (DIA file 237664), an Air Force journal article that retold the incident and its 1978 reprint (NAIDs 40989206, 40989205), interviews that the supervisor of the Mehrabad tower gave two reporters (NAID 40989204), the COMETA report of 1999 and a newspaper article of 1979. COMETA writes that newspapers reported the incident before the message was sent, “for example, France-Soir in the September 21st issue” (RG 255 413270, p. 19).

The night, as the attaché reported it

The message (DIA file 238156, pages 2–4):

“AT ABOUT 1230 AM ON 19 SEP 76 THE IMPERIDAL IRANIAN AIR FORCE (IIAF) COMMAND POST RECEIVED FOUR TELEPHONE CALLS FROM CITIZENS LIVING IN THE SHEMIRAN AREA OF TEHRAN SAYING THAT THEY HAD SEEN STRANGE OBJECTS IN THE SKY. SOME REPORTED A KIND OF BIRD-LIKE OBJECT WHILE OTHERS REPORTED A HELICOPTER WITH A LIGHT ON. THERE WERE NO HELICOPTERS AIRBORNE AT THAT TIME.”

The command post called “BG YOUSEFI, ASSISTANT DEPUTY COMMANDER OF OPERATIONS”: “AFTER HE TOLD THE CITIZEN IT WAS ONLY STARS AND HAD TALKED TO MEHRABAD TOWER HE DECIDED TO LOOK FOR HIMSELF. HE NOTICED AN OBJECT IN THE SKY SIMILAR TO A STAR BIGGER AND BRIGHTER.” He had an F-4 scrambled from Shahrokhi.

• The first F-4 took off “AT 0130 HRS ON THE 19TH” toward “A POINT ABOUT 40 NM NORTH OF TEHRAN”. “AS THE F-4 APPROACHED A RANGE OF 25 NM HE LOST ALL INSTRUMENTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (UHF AND INTERCOM).” When it turned back toward Shahrokhi, “THE AIRCRAFT REGAINED ALL INSTRUMENTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS.”
• A second F-4 was launched “AT 0140 HRS”: “THE BACKSEATER ACQUIRED A RADAR LOCK ON AT 27 NM, 12 O’CLOCK HIGH POSITION WITH THE VC (RATE OF CLOSURE) AT 150 NMPH.” At 25 NM “THE OBJECT MOVED AWAY AT A SPEED THAT WAS VISIBLE ON THE RADAR SCOPE AND STAYED AT 25NM.” “THE SIZE OF THE RADAR RETURN WAS COMPARABLE TO THAT OF A 707 TANKER.”
• South of Tehran, “ANOTHER BRIGHTLY LIGHTED OBJECT, ESTIMATED TO BE ONE HALF TO ONE THIRD THE APPARENT SIZE OF THE MOON, CAME OUT OF THE ORIGINAL OBJECT” and headed for the F-4:

“THE PILOT ATTEMPTED TO FIRE AN AIM-9 MISSILE AT THE OBJECT BUT AT THAT INSTANT HIS WEAPONS CONTROL PANEL WENT OFF AND HE LOST ALL COMMUNICATIONS (UHF AND INTERPHONE).”

• The second object went back “TO THE PRIMARY OBJECT FOR A PERFECT REJOIN”. Another came out and went “STRAIGHT DOWN”; the crew, who had “REGAINED COMMUNICATIONS AND THE WEAPONS CONTROL PANEL”, watched it go down: “THIS OBJECT APPEARED TO COME TO REST GENTLY ON THE EARTH AND CAST A VERY BRIGHT LIGHT OVER AN AREA OF ABOUT 2-3 KILOMETERS.”
• Coming in to Mehrabad, “EACH TIME THEY PASSED THROUGH A MAG. BEARING OF 150 DEGREE FROM EHRABAD THEY LOST THEIR COMMUNICATIONS (UHF AND INTERPHONE) AND THE INS FLUCTUATED FROM 30 DEGREES - 50 DEGREES.” And: “THE ONE CIVIL AIRLINER THAT WAS APPROACHING MEHRABAD DURING THIS SAME TIME EXPERIENCED COMMUNICATIONS FAILURE IN THE SAME VICINITY (KILO ZULU) BUT DID NOT REPORT SEEING ANYTHING.”
• On final approach the crew saw “ANOTHER CYLINDER SHAPED OBJECT”. The tower “DID NOT HAVE A VISUAL ON IT BUT PICKED IT UP AFTER THE PILOT TOLD THEM TO LOOK BETWEEN THE MOUNTAINS AND THE REFINERY.”
• In daylight the crew was flown by helicopter to where the object had apparently landed: “NOTHING WAS NOTICED AT THE SPOT WHERE THEY THOUGHT THE OBJECT LANDED (A DRY LAKE BED)”. To the west they picked up “A VERY NOTICEABLE BEEPER SIGNAL” near a small house, where “THE PEOPLE TALKED ABOUT A LOUD NOISE AND A VERY BRIGHT LIGHT LIKE LIGHTENING.”

The message ends the account with “THE AIRCRAFT AND AREA WHERE THE OBJECT IS BELIEVED TO HAVE LANDED ARE BEING CHECKED FOR POSSIBLE RADIATION.” None of the documents above gives a result of those checks, and the message gives no time for the end of the night.

How DIA rated the report

DIA’s evaluation survives as a one-page form among the records from the National Security Agency in the National Archives (Record Group 615, NAID 596347947, page 2). In front of it is a DIA routing slip dated 8 December 1978, from “Louis E. Foster, RDS-3A, DIA”, with the remark “Per telecon.” (page 1). The attaché’s office later called it “DIA DB-3B2’s evaluation of IIR 6 846 0139 76 dated 23 September 1976” (DIA file 237664, PDF page 26).

The boxes marked on the form:

• reason for evaluation: “SELECTED BY COL MGR”;
• IR responded to: “DIRM Part Three”;
• reliability of information: “Confirmed by other sources”;
• value of information: “High (Unique, Timely, and of Major Significance)”;
• usability of information: “Current Intelligence” and “Potentially Useful”.

The remarks open with a line that is illegible on the scan, and their point a) can be read only in fragments. Points b) to f):

“b) The credibility of many of the witnesses was high (an air force general, qualified aircrews, and experienced tower operators).

c) Visual sightings were confirmed by radar.

d) Similar electromagnetic effects (EME) were reported by three separate aircraft.

e) There were physiological effects on some crew members (i.e. loss of night vision due to the brightness of the object).

f) An inordinate amount of maneuver-ability was displayed by the UFO’s.”

Nothing legible on the form names the other sources that confirmed the report. The only radar in the message it rates is the second F-4’s: “THE BACKSEATER ACQUIRED A RADAR LOCK ON AT 27 NM”.

In July 1978 the attaché’s office sent DIA a newspaper story of June 1978 about another sighting in Iran, with this comment: “The above information is submitted in response to DIA DB-3B2’s evaluation of IIR 6 846 0139 76 dated 23 September 1976. Questions listed in the evaluation cannot be answered by this office at the present time. Any further information that can be obtained will be forwarded.” (IIR 6 846 0380 78, DIA file 237664, PDF pages 25–26)

What the Air Force wrote in 1978

Captain Henry S. Shields of HQ USAFE/INOMP retold the incident in “Cockpit Intelligence”, whose cover calls it “An Operations and Intelligence Journal”, in an issue the file labels “31 Dec 76” (NAID 40989206, images 1–5): “The following article recounts just such an episode as reported by two F-4 Phantom crews of the Imperial Iranian Air Force during late 1976. No additional information or explanation of the strange events has been forthcoming; the story will be filed away and probably forgotten, but it makes interesting, and possibly disturbing, reading.” (image 3)

The US Air Force Security Service reprinted the article in its “MIJI Quarterly” for October 1978 (MQ 3-78), under a note from the editors (NAID 40989205, image 3):

“If the two F-4s involved in this incident were piloted by US military aviators we would have one of the most bizarre MIJI reports to date. Although this incident is incomplete and cannot be substantiated, it contains food for thought. The explanation of this incident is left to the imagination of each reader. No other information of this kind is on file in our MIJI data bank.”

The reprint starts the night “Until 0300”; the article it reprints has “Until 0030”, and the message “AT ABOUT 1230 AM”.

How the story grew

• 23 September 1976, the message. The radar lock is the second F-4’s, reported through a conversation. The airliner that lost communications near Mehrabad “DID NOT REPORT SEEING ANYTHING” (DIA file 238156, page 3).
• 22 December 1976 and January 1977, the tower supervisor. Hossain Perouzi, who supervised the night shift at the Mehrabad tower, gave interviews to two reporters. Both versions say the airport radar was not working. The Iranian reporter: “The radar was blank, since it was under repair.” The British reporter quotes him: “Our radar was not working, but it was out of operation for 24 hours maintenance, so we had nothing on radar either.” (NAID 40989204, image 1) The Iranian reporter’s version starts the night at “10:30 P.M., Sept. 18, 1976”; the British reporter’s has the object disappear shortly after 4 am local time (images 1, 6).
• 19 January 1979, The Washington Post. “That object was tracked by Iranian ground radar, seen independently by the crew of a commercial airliner and pursued by the F4, which, according to the report, experienced a breakdown of their electronic communications devices when they neared the object.” (CIA reading room, CIA-RDP88-01315R000300070004-1) The message says that the airliner’s crew did not report seeing anything, and has no ground radar tracking the object; in both interviews with the tower supervisor the airport radar was not working.
• 1999, COMETA. The English translation in the US releases calls the general “the third in command of this air force”, where the message has “ASSISTANT DEPUTY COMMANDER OF OPERATIONS” (RG 255 413270, p. 19). It quotes DIA’s point b) with “experienced radar operators” (p. 20); on the form the words are “experienced tower operators”.

Where it was

The message places the callers in “THE SHEMIRAN AREA OF TEHRAN”, sends the first F-4 to “A POINT ABOUT 40 NM NORTH OF TEHRAN” and has the second follow the object “ON A COURSE TO THE SOUTH OF TEHRAN”; the crew landed at Mehrabad. The spot where the object seemed to come down, “A DRY LAKE BED”, is not located. The pin is OpenStreetMap’s point for Tehran (relation 6663864), rounded by us to 35.69° N, 51.39° E; it marks the city, not a position of the aircraft or of the light.

Why this scores where it does

Witnesses: 4. A general, two aircrews and the Mehrabad tower, as the message names them; DIA called the credibility of many of them high. Not 5: none of them speaks in the file. The message passes on what its source heard from a sub-source and from one of the pilots.

Radar: 2. The message reports a lock by the second F-4 at 27 NM. There is no recording of it, and in both interviews with its night supervisor the tower’s radar was not working.

Optics: 0. No photograph, film or infrared recording.

Physical trace: 0. The aircraft and the landing area were “BEING CHECKED FOR POSSIBLE RADIATION”; no result is in the file.

Multi-channel: 3. Callers, the general’s own sighting, two crews, an airborne radar and the tower. All of it reaches the file through one conversation.

Documentation: 4. The message, DIA’s evaluation and the attaché office’s answer of 1978 are public, the message in two copies. Not 5: the message is second-hand by its own account, and the evaluation is partly illegible.

Anomaly: 3. Losses of instruments and communications in two aircraft, coming and going with range to the light, and an airliner losing communications in the same area. All of it is known only as reported.

Data today: 2. No radar recording, aircraft log, maintenance record or radiation result can be opened, and in 1978 the attaché’s office could not answer the questions DIA asked.

The overall is 2.2: class C, material gaps.

What would settle it

• The F-4s’ maintenance records after the sortie and any recording of the second F-4’s radar.
• The results of the checks the message says were under way: “THE AIRCRAFT AND AREA WHERE THE OBJECT IS BELIEVED TO HAVE LANDED ARE BEING CHECKED FOR POSSIBLE RADIATION.”
• The questions in DIA’s evaluation and any later answer to them; in 1978 the attaché’s office wrote that they “cannot be answered by this office at the present time”.
• An account by the pilots themselves, rather than through the conversation the message rests on.